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The newly developing ¯eld of agent-based computational economics (ACE) is roughly de-
¯ned by its practitioners as the computational study of economies modelled as evolving systems of
autonomous interacting agents.1 A principal concern of ACE researchers is to understand the ap-
parently spontaneous formation of global regularities in economic processes, such as the unplanned
coordination of trading activities in decentralized market economies that economists associate with
Adam Smith's invisible hand. The challenge is to explain how these global regularities arise from
the bottom up, through the repeated local interactions of autonomous agents channeled through
socioeconomic institutions, rather than from the top-down imposition of ¯ctitious coordination
mechanisms such as market clearing constraints or an assumption of single representative agents.
The study of evolutionary economics is by no means new, of course. Even before Darwin,
attempts were made to apply evolutionary ideas to socioeconomic behavior.
Although this early work is now largely ignored by economists, economic textbooks still typically
include at least some mention of the ideas of J. Schumpeter regarding the evolution of economic
institutions. Moreover, Schumpeter's work, together with the seminal work by A. A. Alchian on
uncertainty and evolution in economic systems, appears to have strongly in°uenced the subsequent
well-known work by R. Nelson, S. Winter and various of their collaborators on evolutionary theories
of economic change. In addition, one has the work of W. B. Arthur on economies incorporating
positive feedbacks, the work by Richard Day on dynamic economies characterized by complex phase
transitions, the work by J. Foster on an evolutionary approach to macroeconomics, R. Heiner's work
1For extensive on-line ACE resources, including surveys, an annotated syllabus of readings, software, and pointers
to individual researchers and research groups, see the ACE Web site at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm.
1on the origins of predictable behavior, J. Hirshleifer's work on evolutionary models in economics
and law, and U. Witt's work on economic natural selection. These and numerous other interesting
studies on evolutionary economics are reviewed by Nelson (1995).
More recently, as detailed in Samuelson (1997), a number of researchers have been focusing on
the potential economic applicability of evolutionary game theory with replicator dynamics. In these
studies, game strategies are distributed over a ¯xed number of strategy types, and the strategies
reproduce over time in direct proportion to their relative ¯tness.
Exploiting the recent advent of more powerful computational tools, such as object-oriented pro-
gramming, ACE researchers such as Arifovic (1994), Arthur et al. (1997), Axelrod (1997), Epstein
& Axtell (1996), Kirman (1997), Kollman et al. (1997), Marks (1992), McFadzean and Tesfatsion
(1999), Miller (1996), Tesfatsion (1997a,b), Vriend (1995), and Young (1998) have been able to
extend this earlier work on evolutionary economics in four key ways.
First, agents in ACE frameworks are typically modelled as heterogeneous entities that determine
their interactions with other agents and with their environment on the basis of internalized data
and behavioral rules. These agents thus tend to have a great deal more internal cognitive structure
and autonomy than conventionally modelled economic agents. Second, a broader range of agent
interactions is typically permitted in ACE frameworks, with predatory and cooperative associations
taking center stage along with price and quantity relationships. Third, the evolutionary process is
generally represented as natural selection pressures acting directly on agent characteristics rather
than as population-level laws of motion. These natural selection pressures result in the continual
creation of new modes of agent behavior and an ever-changing network of agent interactions. Fourth,
ACE frameworks are computer implemented as virtual economic worlds that grow themselves along
a real time-line, much like a culture grows in a petri dish. In principle, once initial conditions are
set, all subsequent events in these virtual economic worlds are initiated and driven by agent-agent
and agent-environment interactions; no further outside interventions by the modeler (e.g., o®-line
¯xed point calculations) are permitted.
In brief, then, ACE is a blend of concepts and tools from evolutionary economics, cognitive
science, and computer science. It represents a methodological approach that may ultimately per-
mit two important developments: (a) the rigorous testing, re¯nement, and extension of theories
developed in the earlier literature on evolutionary economics that were found to be analytically
intractable; and (b) the rigorous formulation and testing of conceptually integrated socioeconomic
2int main () f
Init(); // Construct the initial trader generation
// with random trade strategies.
For (G = 1,...,GMax)f // Enter the generation cycle loop.
// Generation Cycle:
InitGen(); // Con¯gure traders with user-supplied
// parameter values (initial expected
// utility levels, capacity quotas,...).
For (I = 1,...,IMax) f // Enter the trade cycle loop.
// Trade Cycle:
MatchTraders(); // Determine trade partners,
// given expected utilities,
// and record job search and
// inactivity costs.
Trade(); // Implement trades and
// record trade payo®s.
UpdateExp(); // Update expected utilities using
g // newly recorded costs and payo®s.
// Environment Step:
AssessFitness(); // Assess trader ¯tness scores.
Output(); // Output trader information.
// Evolution Step:




Table I: Pseudo-Code for the Trade Network Game (TNG)
theories compatible with theory and data from many di®erent relevant ¯elds currently separated
by arti¯cial disciplinary boundaries.
2 Illustration: An ACE Trade Network Framework
To illustrate the ACE approach in more concrete terms, consider the Trade Network Game
(TNG) developed by Tesfatsion (1997b) and McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999) for studying the
formation and evolution of trade networks. As depicted in Table I, the TNG consists of successive
generations of traders who choose and refuse trade partners on the basis of continually updated
expected payo®s, engage in risky trades modelled as two person games, and evolve their trade
strategies over time.
The TNG framework facilitates the computational study of markets from an agent-based per-
spective in three key ways.
First, as seen in Table I, the TNG framework is modular in design. This means that experi-
mentation with alternative speci¯cations for market structure, search and matching among traders,




Market protocols for communicating with other traders;
Market protocols for trade partner search and matching;
Market protocols for trade interactions.
Internally Stored State Information:
My attributes;
My endowments;
My beliefs and preferences;
Addresses I have for myself and for other traders;
Additional data I have about other traders.
Internal Behavioral Rules:
My rules for gathering and processing new information;
My rules for determining my trade behavior;
My rules for updating my beliefs and preferences;
My rules for measuring my utility (¯tness) level;
My rules for modifying my rules.
g;
Table II: A TNG Trader as a Software Agent
can easily be undertaken | much like changing a lightbulb in a multi-bulb lamp | as long as
the interfaces (inputs and outputs) for the modules implementing these speci¯cations remain un-
changed. Moreover, each of these modules can potentially be grounded in trader-initiated actions
in the sense that the module is implemented via behavioral rules internal to the traders.
Second, as seen in Table II, each TNG trader is an autonomous software agent (\tradebot") with
internalized social norms, internally stored state information, and internal behavioral rules. The
traders can therefore engage in anticipatory behavior. Moreover, using stored addresses together
with internalized communication protocols, the traders can communicate with each other at event-
triggered times, a feature not present in standard economic models.
Third, the TNG permits the rigorous and routine experimental study of non-steady state mar-
ket dynamics at three di®erent levels: individual characteristics of traders; interactions among
traders (network formation); and social welfare as measured by descriptive statistics such as av-
erage trader welfare. For example, the TNG framework is currently being applied to the study of
worker-employer market power relationships in evolutionary labor markets with adaptive search;
see Tesfatsion (1999).
3 Conclusion
In summary, the hallmark of the ACE approach to the study of economic processes is a
4bottom up perspective, in the sense that global behavior is grounded in local agent interactions. The
TNG framework brie°y outlined in Section 2 illustrates how the ACE approach might be specialized
to the study of evolutionary trade networks. More generally, however, the ACE approach permits
economists to begin the di±cult task of studying the self-organizing capabilities of decentralized
market economies.
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